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Abstract
We present a continuous-time generalization of the seminal R&D model of d’Aspremont
and Jacquemin (American Economic Review, Vol. 78, No. 5) to examine the trade-off
between the benefits of allowing firms to cooperate in R&D and the corresponding increased
potential for product market collusion. We consider all trajectories that are candidates for an
optimal solution as well as initial marginal cost levels that exceed the choke price. Firms
that collude develop further a wider range of initial technologies, pursue innovations more
quickly, and are less likely to abandon a technology. Product market collusion could thus
yield higher total surplus.
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1 Introduction
An important reason for allowing firms to set up R&D cooperatives is that these “organizations,
jointly controlled by at least two participating entities, whose primary purpose is to engage
in cooperative R&D” (Caloghirou et al., 2003) internalize technological spillovers - the free
flow of knowledge from the knowledge creator to its competitors.1 The exemption for R&D
cooperatives in anti-cartel legislation is thus perceived to diminish the failure of the market
for R&D.2 However, as Scherer (1980) observes: “the most egregious price fixing schemes in
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Seldeslachts, Nan Yang, and to seminar participants at the Tinbergen Institute (Amsterdam, June 2011), at EARIE
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1Bloom et al. (2013) estimate that a 10% increase in a competitor’s R&D is associated with up to a 3.8% increase
in a firm’s own market value. Internalizing technological spillovers is one of the prime reasons for firms to join an
R&D cooperative (Hernan et al., 2003; see also Ro¨ller et al., 2007).
2See Martin (1997) for an overview of the policy treatment of R&D cooperatives in the E.U., the U.S. and Japan.
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American history were brought about by R&D cooperatives”, an observation that constitutes
the classic counterargument to a permissive antitrust treatment of R&D markets (Pfeffer and
Nowak (1976), Grossman and Shapiro (1986), Brodley, 1990).3 At the same time, it is quite well
established that the prospect of future market power enhances a firm’s incentives to invest in
R&D.4 As Alan Greenspan (1962) puts it:
No one will ever know what new products, processes, machines, and cost-saving
mergers failed to come into existence, killed by the Sherman Act before they were
born. No one can ever compute the price that all of us have paid for that Act which,
by inducing less effective use of capital, has kept our standard of living lower than
would otherwise have been possible.
In this paper we develop a dynamic model of R&D that considers explicitly the cost of “new
. . . processes” that “failed to come into existence . . . before they were born” because of the ban
on price-fixing agreements.
The channels through which cooperation in R&D facilitates product market collusion have
been examined in a number of theoretical studies (Martin (1995), Greenlee and Cassiman (1999),
Cabral (2000), Lambertini et al. (2002), Miyagiwa, 2009). According to Fisher (1990, p. 194):
. . . [firms] cooperating in R&D will tend to talk about other forms of cooperation.
Furthermore, in learning how other firms react and adjust in living with each other,
each cooperating firm will get better at coordination. Hence, competition in the
product market is likely to be harmed.
In the short run, the reduced intensity of product market competition is likely to hurt con-
sumers. At the same time, it could enhance the functioning of an R&D cooperative. For instance,
Geroski (1992) argues that it is the feedback from product markets that directs research towards
profitable tracks and that, therefore, for an innovation to be commercially successful, there must
be strong ties between marketing and development of new products. And Jacquemin (1988)
puts forward that R&D cooperatives are fragile and unstable. He reasons that when there is no
cooperation in the product market, there exists a continuous fear that one partner in the R&D
cooperative may be strengthened in such a way that it will become too strong a competitor in
the product market. Preventing firms from collaborating in the product market may therefore
3Goeree and Helland (2008) find that in the U.S. the probability that firms join an R&D cooperative has gone
down due to a revision of antitrust leniency policy in 1993. This revision is perceived as making collusion less
attractive. Goeree and Helland (2008) conclude that “Our results are consistent with RJVs [research joint ventures]
serving, at least in part, a collusive function.” Related evidence is reported by Duso et al. (2014). They find that the
combined market share declines if partners in an RJV compete on the same product market (“horizontal RJVs”), while
it increases if members of the RJV are not direct rivals (“vertical RJVs”). The laboratory experiments of Suetens
(2008) show that members of an RJV are more likely to collude on price.
4The original observation is due to Schumpeter (1934, p. 82): “As soon as we go into the details and inquire into
the individual items in which progress was most conspicuous, the trail leads not to the doors of those firms that work
under conditions of comparatively free competition but precisely to the doors of the large concerns . . . and a shocking
suspicion dawns upon us that big business may have had more to do with creating that standard of living than with
keeping it down.” A formal treatment can be found in Tirole (1988).
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destabilize R&D cooperatives, or prevent their formation in the first place. Our focus is on private
incentives to develop cost saving technologies over time. In particular, we show that if firms
collude in the product market, a wider range of technologies is fully developed. We also show
that firms competing in the product market realize an inferior productive efficiency. We thus
identify situations where product market collusion increases total surplus.
Dynamic models of R&D were first introduced to study patent races whereby successful
innovators capture the entire market.5 Meanwhile, a large literature has developed on the relation
between intellectual property rights and antitrust policies. For instance, Quirmbach (1993)
finds that there is an optimal level of collusion that is in between perfect competition and full
collusion. And Green and Scotchmer (1995) show that it is optimal to allow for collusion
through sequential licensing in case the next innovation is a truly new application of existing
patents. More recently, another strand of dynamic R&D models has developed: continuous-time
generalizations of strategic R&D models.6 Cellini and Lambertini (2005) is the first continuous-
time generalization of the seminal analysis of d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988). In the duopoly
game of d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988), firms first invest in cost-reducing R&D and then
play a Cournot game in the product market. In the continuous-time version of Cellini and
Lambertini (2005), both firms start from an initial technology (that is, a level of marginal cost)
and invest continuously in R&D. This gradually reduces the initial level of marginal cost towards
the steady-state level. In contrast to the static generalization of d’Aspremont and Jacquemin
(1988) by Hinloopen (2000), Cellini and Lambertini (2005) find that the aggregate level of R&D
is monotonically increasing in the number of independent competitors.
We also consider a continuous-time generalization of d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988).
There are two distinguishing features of our analysis. First, we consider all possible initial
marginal cost levels, including those exceeding the choke price (the lowest price for which there
is no demand). Especially in the early stages of development, it is quite likely that the cost of a
new technology (the cost, say, to develop a prototype) exceeds the highest willingness to pay
in the market. We characterize situations where such initial technologies are only developed if
firms collude in the product market. Indeed, excluding initial marginal costs that are above the
choke price ignores “ . . . new . . . processes . . . [that] failed to come into existence, [as they are]
killed by the Sherman Act before they were born.” These instances constitute a direct welfare
gain of product market collusion.
Second, in addition to near-equilibrium paths, we consider all trajectories that are candidates
for an optimal solution. This global analysis yields a bifurcation diagram that indicates for every
possible parameter combination the qualitative features of any market equilibrium as well as
5This literature starts with Loury (1979) and Lee and Wilde (1980); Reinganum (1989) surveys the early
contributions. Patent race models examine, in essence, the time it takes for a cost-saving innovation to be completed.
R&D investments reduce this completion period. Because in these models the R&D process itself cannot fail, the
R&D-investment decision is transformed into a static one.
6There is also a small literature that considers (stationary) repeated game models of R&D; see Cabral (2000) and
Lambertini et al. (2002). These ‘dynamic’ models do not allow for “smoothing the investment efforts over a long
time” (Cellini and Lambertini, 2005), a type of investment behavior that is observed in practice and that constitutes a
key feature of continuous-time models.
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of the transient dynamics towards it.7 We thus identify critical parameter values: points in
parameter space at which the optimal investment function changes qualitatively. In particular, we
determine the value of marginal costs for which R&D investments are terminated, and for which
they are not initiated at all. We prove that these critical cost levels are affected by firm conduct.
Therefore, extending the R&D cooperative to product market collusion can lead to qualitatively
different long-run solutions, in spite of starting from an identical initial technology.
The related literature has not considered initial marginal cost levels that exceed the choke
price, nor has it carried out a global analysis.8 The only exception is Hinloopen et al. (2013),
who characterize the equilibria of a continuous-time dynamic monopoly with R&D investments.
We expand their analysis in three directions. First, we consider a duopoly rather than a monopoly.
Second, we examine two different scenarios: one in which firms cooperate in R&D and compete
in the product market (labeled ‘partial collusion’), and one in which firms cooperate both in
R&D and in setting price (labeled ‘full collusion’). Indeed, comparing the two scenarios allows
us to examine the effects of extending cooperation in R&D towards collusion in the product
market. And third, rather than relying on numerical simulations, we prove a set of propositions
that characterize the dynamics of the model throughout the entire parameter space.
Our framework yields four possible outcomes for any initial draw of a new technology
(cf. Hinloopen et al., 2013). First of all, a ‘promising technology’ arrives, whereby the initial
technology is developed through continuous R&D investments. This can occur for initial cost
levels both below and above the choke price. In the latter case, production starts only after
some time, because early R&D efforts have to bring down marginal cost below the choke price.
Second, a ‘strained market’ arises: initial marginal cost is below the choke price and firms invest
in R&D, but the technology is not likely to be developed to full materialization.9 In case of an
‘uncertain future’, the third situation, it is not immediately clear whether the long-run steady state
will be reached, or that it is optimal to gradually leave the market. Only time will tell. Fourth, an
‘obsolete technology’ can emerge: whatever the initial marginal cost, the technology is either not
developed, or developed only to be taken off the market in due time. The long-run steady state
will not be reached in either case.
All four technologies can emerge under both partial collusion and full collusion. Comparing
the two scenarios throughout the entire parameter space, we find that if firms collude in the
product market (i) it is more likely that an initial technology qualifies as a Promising Technology,
and if so, that it is more likely to be developed further, (ii) it is less likely that an initial technology
7Solution structures may change qualitatively due to variations in parameter values (indifference points may
appear, steady states may lose their stability, and so on). These qualitative changes due to smooth variations in
parameters are called bifurcations. For an introduction, see Grass et al. (2008), or Kiseleva and Wagener (2010).
8That literature is still small. It includes Cellini and Lambertini (2005, 2009), Lambertini and Mantovani (2009,
2010), and Kovac et al. (2010). In all these papers any of the initial (permissible) technologies will be developed
to full materialization; technologies that are only developed under specific regimes (i.e. product market collusion)
remain hidden.
9This situation resembles the ‘sailing ship effect’ of Cooper and Schendel (1976) (see also Howells, 2002),
whereby the arrival of a new, possibly superior technology spurs the development of the old technology. In our case,
there is no rival technology that induces continued investment in a technology that is bound to leave the market.
Rather, it is the technology itself (characterized by the size of the initial marginal cost) that makes it optimal for firms
to gradually take it off the market in due time.
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qualifies as an Obsolete Technology, and if so, it is more likely that firms invest in R&D, albeit
temporarily, and (iii) if an initial technology causes a Strained Market or if it induces an Uncertain
Future, it is less likely that it will be taken off the market in due time. Put differently, due to
product market collusion it is more likely that firms invest in R&D, and that these investments
eventually lead to a steady state with positive production.
Our analysis qualifies the per se prohibition of collusion in product markets for high-tech
industries. A higher total surplus obtains if colluding firms develop an initial technology and
arrive at the saddle-point steady state while firms that compete in the product market would not
develop the technology at all. We show that this is more likely to happen if new technologies
arrive in circumstances that offer a high profit potential (that is, large markets and efficient R&D
processes). Under these circumstances, product market collusion can also yield higher total
surplus if competing firms would develop the new technology as well, be it to take it off the
market in due time, or to arrive at the saddle-point steady state. And in so far higher R&D
investments as such are desirable (as suggested in the endogenous growth literature; see e.g.
Grossman and Helpman (1991), Aghion and Howitt, 1992) the case for prohibiting collusion per
se is further weakened. On the other hand, colluding firms tend to hold on longer to technologies
that are destined to leave the market. This is not desirable from a social welfare point of view if
that prevents the development of new, superior technologies.
A particularly difficult situation arises when the initial technology is above the choke price
and if it will be developed only if firms collude in the product market. The welfare cost of
prohibiting firms to collude then remains hidden because no production is affected by this
prohibition. There is no production yet, and because collusion is prohibited, there will be no
production in the future. Put differently, no production will be taken off the market if firms are
prohibited to collude in the product market, leaving the welfare cost unnoticed. Our analysis thus
offers a first glance at “new . . . processes . . . [that] failed to come into existence, killed by the
Sherman Act before they were born.”
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The basics of the model are introduced in
Section 2. In Section 3, the necessary conditions for optimal production and investment schedules
are derived under partial collusion and full collusion. The corresponding bifurcation diagrams
are derived in Section 4 and the two scenarios are compared in Section 5. Section 6 concludes.
An appendix contains the proofs of all propositions.
2 The model
Time t is continuous: t ∈ [0,∞). There are two a priori fully symmetric firms that both produce
a homogeneous good at constant marginal costs c(t). At every instant, the market price p(t) is
given as
p(t) = A−Q(t), (1)
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where Q(t) = q1(t) + q2(t), with qi(t) the quantity produced by firm i at time t, and where A is
the choke price.10
Each firm i can reduce its marginal cost ci(t) by investing in R&D. In particular, when firm i
exerts R&D effort ki(t), its marginal cost evolves as
dci
dt
(t) ≡ c˙i(t) = ci(t) (−ki(t)− βkj(t) + δ) , (2)
where kj(t) is the R&D effort exerted by its rival and where β ∈ [0, 1] measures the degree of
spillover. Note that efficiency of production is assumed to decrease at a constant rate, as captured
by δ > 0. This depreciation is due to (exogenous) aging of technology and organizational
forgetting (Besanko et al. (2010), Lambertini and Mantovani, 2009). As Benkard (2004, p.
590) observes: “. . . an aircraft producer’s stock of production experience is constantly being
eroded by turnover, lay offs and simple losses of proficiency at seldom repeated tasks. When
producers cut back output, this erosion can even outpace learning, causing the stock of experience
to decrease.” In our model, R&D investment yields know-how gains but the logic of the argument
is the same. For instance, complementary inputs that are typically purchased also constitute a
fraction of production cost. Incorporating these inputs becomes ever more costly due to their
inherent evolution over time, especially for firms that are relatively sluggish in R&D, as R&D
efforts also determine any firm’s ‘absorptive capacity’ (Cohen and Levinthal, 1989).11
Both firms are endowed with an identical initial technology ci(0) = cj(0) = c0, which is
assumed to be drawn by Nature. Per unit of time, the costs of R&D efforts are
Γi(ki) = bk
2
i , (3)
where b > 0 is inversely related to the cost-efficiency of the R&D process. The R&D process is
thus assumed to exhibit decreasing returns to scale (Schwartzman, 1976; see also the discussion
in Hinloopen et al., 2013). Both firms discount the future with the same constant rate ρ > 0.
Either firm’s instantaneous profit therefore equals
pii(qi, Q, ki, ci) = (A−Q− ci)qi − bk2i , (4)
with corresponding total discounted profit
Πi(qi, Q, ki, ci) =
∫ ∞
0
pii(qi, Q, ki, ci)e
−ρtdt. (5)
The model has five parameters: A, β, b, δ, and ρ. To simplify the analysis, we rescale the
10We thus assume that the market size, A, is fixed and known to both firms. A random market size would not
change any of our results qualitatively. See Hinloopen et al. (2013) for an analysis of unexpected changes in A.
11A non-positive depreciation rate yields trivial equilibria. Every initial technology will be developed in case δ
is negative, as there is an exogenous reduction in marginal cost over time. For δ = 0, consider δ to be marginally
positive. In that case, the value of initial marginal cost that would make it optimal not to invest in R&D is far above
the choke price because only an infinitesimally small investment in R&D is then needed to reduce marginal cost over
time.
6
model such that it has only three parameters. Rescaling is done by choosing ‘natural units’
for the problem; it does not involve making special parameter choices. Rather, each choice of
parameters in the original model corresponds to a choice of parameters in the rescaled model.
The complexity reduction obtained by the scaling is a consequence of the fact that in the original
parameters, many choices give rise to mathematically equivalent models.12
Lemma 1. By choosing the units of t, qi, qj , ci, cj , ki, and kj appropriately, we can assume
A = 1, b = 1, and δ = 1. This yields the following rescaled version of the model:
p˜ii(q˜i, Q, k˜i, c˜i) = (1− Q˜− c˜i)q˜i − k˜2i , (6)
Π˜i(q˜i, Q˜, k˜i, c˜i) =
∫ ∞
0
p˜ii(q˜i, Q˜, k˜i, c˜i)e
−ρ˜t˜dt˜ (7)
˙˜ci = c˜i
(
1−
(
k˜i + βk˜j
)
φ
)
, c˜i(0) = c˜0, c˜i ∈ [0,∞) ∀ t˜ ∈ [0,∞) (8)
q˜i ≥ 0, k˜i ≥ 0 (9)
ρ˜ > 0, φ > 0 (10)
with conversion rules: qi = Aq˜i, qj = Aq˜j , ki = A√b k˜i, kj =
A√
b
k˜j , ci = Ac˜i, cj = Ac˜j ,
pii = A
2p˜ii, pij = A2p˜ij , φ = Aδ
√
b
, t = t˜δ , ρ˜ =
ρ
δ .
Rescaling the model as in Lemma 1 introduces a new parameter: φ. It is one-to-one related
to the profit potential of a technology. Higher potential revenues come with a higher A, and each
unit of R&D effort costs more if b increases, while it reduces marginal cost by less the higher
is δ. In sum, a lower (higher) φ corresponds to a lower (higher) profit potential. For notational
convenience we henceforth omit tildes.
3 Partial Collusion and Full Collusion
In this section we derive the necessary conditions for optimal production and investment schedules
in case firms cooperate in R&D but compete in the product market (Section 3.1), and in case
firms cooperate in R&D and collude in the product market (Section 3.2).
3.1 Partial Collusion
Both firms operate their own R&D laboratory and production facility. They select their output
levels non-cooperatively and adopt a strictly cooperative behavior in determining their R&D
efforts so as to maximize joint profits. These assumptions amount to imposing a priori the
symmetry condition ki(t) = kj(t) = k(t).13 ci(0) = cj(0) = c0 implies that ci(t) = cj(t) =
12The proof of Lemma 1 is analogous to the proof of Lemma 1 in Hinloopen et al. (2013).
13Throughout the paper we consider symmetric equilibria only. See Salant and Shaffer (1998) for a specific
example of a static model of R&D where individual firms face different capacity constraints in which it is optimal for
firms in an R&D cooperative to make unequal investments.
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c(t). Equation (8) thus reads as
c˙ = c(1− (1 + β)φk). (11)
It may seem reasonable to assume that when firms cooperate in R&D, they also fully share
information, that is, to assume the level of spillover to be at its maximum (β = 1; see Kamien
et al., 1992). For the sake of generality, we do not a priori fix the value of β at its maximal
value. There are also intuitive arguments for not doing so as there might still be some ex post
duplication and/or substitutability in R&D outputs if firms operate separate laboratories (see the
discussion in Hinloopen, 2003).
The instantaneous profit of firm i is
pii(qi, Q, k, c) = (1−Q− c)qi − k2, (12)
with Q = q1 + q2, yielding its total discounted profit over time
Πi(qi, Q, k, c) =
∫ ∞
0
pii(qi, Q, k, c)e
−ρtdt. (13)
As firms jointly decide on their R&D efforts, the only independent decisions are those of
production. However, as quantity variables do not appear in the equation for the state variable (11),
production feedback strategies of a dynamic game are simply static Cournot-Nash strategies of
each corresponding instantaneous game.
Maximizing pii over qi ≥ 0 gives us standard Cournot best-response functions for the product
market
qi(qj) =
{
1
2(1− c− qj) if qj < 1− c,
0 if qj ≥ 1− c.
(14)
Note that the constraint qi ≥ 0 is binding when qj ≥ 1− c. Solving for Cournot-Nash production
levels, we obtain
qN =
{
1
3(1− c) if c < 1,
0 if c ≥ 1.
(15)
Consequently, the instantaneous profit of each firm is14
pi(c, k) =
{
1
9(1− c)2 − k2 if c < 1,
− k2 if c ≥ 1.
(16)
14We implicitly assume that firms face no financial constraints; they can invest in R&D prior to production. Credit
rationing would impose an upper limit on the value of an indifference point; qualitatively it would not change our
conclusions. For a sample of Italian manufacturing firms Piga and Atzeni (2007) find that credit constraints are
negligible for R&D intensive firms. Bond et al. (2005) find no significant relationship between the level of R&D
investments and cash flow for German and U.K firms, while Harhoff (1998) finds a weak but statistically significant
relationship for both small and large German firms. The sensitivity of R&D investments to cash flow fluctuations
seems to be stronger for U.S. firms (e.g., Himmelberg and Petersen (1994), Hall et al. (1999)), but by and large, the
literature on the importance of financial constraints for R&D investment is inconclusive (see Hall and Lerner (2010)
for an overview).
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The dynamic optimization problem of the R&D cooperative boils down to finding an R&D effort
schedule k∗ for either firm that maximizes the total discounted joint profit, taking into account
the state equation (11), the initial condition c(0) = c0, and the control constraint k(t) ≥ 0 which
must hold at all times. Note that according to (11), if c0 > 0, then c(t) > 0 for all t. The state
space of this problem is the interval [0,∞) of marginal cost levels.
To solve this problem, we introduce the current-value Pontryagin function (also called the
un-maximized Hamilton or pre-Hamilton function)15
P (c, k, λ) =
{
1
9(1− c)2 − k2 + λc(1− (1 + β)φk) if c < 1,
− k2 + λc(1− (1 + β)φk) if c ≥ 1,
(17)
where λ is the current-value co-state variable of a firm in the R&D cooperative. The co-state (or
shadow value) measures the marginal worth of the increment in the state c for each firm at time t
when moving along the optimal path. We expect λ(t) ≤ 0 along optimal trajectories because
marginal cost is a “bad”.
We use Pontryagin’s maximum principle to obtain the solution to our optimization problem.
Maximizing over the control k ≥ 0 yields
k = max
{
0,−1
2
λc(1 + β)φ
}
. (18)
The maximum principle states further that the optimizing trajectory necessarily corresponds to
the trajectory of the state-costate system
c˙ =
∂P
∂λ
, λ˙ = ρλ− ∂P
∂c
, (19)
where k is replaced by its maximizing value. For λ ≤ 0, relation (18) gives a one-to-one
correspondence between the co-state λ and the control k. We use this relation to transform the
state-costate system into a state-control system which an optimizing trajectory has to satisfy
necessarily as well. This system consists of two regimes (following the two part composition
of the Pontryagin function). The first one corresponds to c < 1 and positive production (q =
(1− c)/3). The second one corresponds to c ≥ 1 and zero production.16 The state-control system
with positive production consists of the following two differential equations:{
c˙ = c (1− (1 + β)φk) ,
k˙ = ρk − (1+β)φ9 c(1− c).
(20)
15We omit a factor 2 for joint profits to obtain the solution expressed in per-firm values. Due to symmetry,
maximizing per-firm total profit corresponds to maximizing joint total profit.
16Recall from Lemma 1 that A = 1 in the rescaled model. In the non-rescaled model, the analogous conditions for
positive and zero production are c(t) < A and c(t) ≥ A, respectively.
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The state-control system with zero production is given by{
c˙ = c (1− (1 + β)φk) ,
k˙ = ρk.
(21)
3.2 Full Collusion
Under full collusion, firms determine jointly their R&D efforts and their output levels. This
amounts to imposing a priori the symmetry conditions ki(t) = kj(t) = k(t) and qi(t) = qj(t) =
q(t). Equation (8) reads again as Equation (11). The profit of each firm at every instant is
pi(q, k, c) = (1− 2q − c)q − k2, (22)
with corresponding total discounted profit
Π(q, k, c) =
∫ ∞
0
pi(q, k, c)e−ρtdt. (23)
The optimal control problem of the two colluding firms is to find controls q∗ and k∗ that maximize
the profit functional Π subject to the state equation (11), the initial condition c(0) = c0, and two
control constraints that must hold at all times: q ≥ 0 and k ≥ 0.17 Notice again that according to
(11), if c0 > 0, then c(t) > 0 for all t.
The current-value Pontryagin function in case of full collusion reads as:
P (c, q, k, λ) = (1− 2q − c) q − k2 + λc (1− (1 + β)φk) , (24)
where λ is the current-value co-state variable. It now measures the marginal worth at time t of an
increment in the state c for a colluding firm when moving along the optimal path.
The necessary conditions for the solution to the dynamic optimization problem consist again
of a state-control system which has two regimes. As in the partial collusion case, the first
regime corresponds to c < 1 and positive production (q = (1− c)/4), while the second regime
corresponds to c ≥ 1 and zero production.
The state-control system in the region with positive production reads as{
c˙ = c (1− (1 + β)φk) ,
k˙ = ρk − (1+β)φ8 c(1− c),
(25)
whereas the state-control system with zero production is{
c˙ = c (1− (1 + β)φk) ,
k˙ = ρk.
(26)
17Again, due to symmetry, maximizing per-firm total profit corresponds to maximizing joint total profit.
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4 Analysis
Consider the system {
c˙ = c (1− (1 + β)φk),
k˙ = ρk − αφ(1 + β)c(1− c)χ(c),
(27)
where χ(c) = 1 if 0 < c < 1 and χ(c) = 0 if c ≥ 1 (or c ≤ 0). Systems (20) – (21) and
(25) – (26) are instances of system (27), with α = 1/9 for the partial collusion scenario and
α = 1/8 for the full collusion scenario.18
The first result gives the properties of the steady states of the state-control system (see
Appendix A.1 for the proof).
Proposition 1. Let
D =
1
4
− ρ
α(1 + β)2φ2
.
Depending on the value of D, there are three different situations.
1. If D > 0, the state-control system with positive production (25) has three steady states:
i. (ce, ke) = (0, 0) is an unstable node,
ii. (ce, ke) =
(
1
2 +
√
D, 1(1+β)φ
)
is either an unstable node or an unstable focus, and
iii. (ce, ke) =
(
1
2 −
√
D, 1(1+β)φ
)
is a saddle-point steady state.
2. At D = 0, there are two steady states:
i. (ce, ke) = (0, 0), which is an unstable node, and
ii. (ce, ke) =
(
1
2 ,
1
(1+β)φ
)
, which is a semi-stable steady state.
3. If D < 0, the origin (ce, ke) = (0, 0) is the unique steady state of the state-control system
with positive production, which is unstable.
The system consequently exhibits a saddle-node bifurcation at D = 0.
The stable manifold of the saddle-point steady state is one of the candidates for an optimal
solution. However, as neither the Mangasarian nor the Arrow concavity conditions are satisfied,
the stable manifold is not necessarily optimal. Note that Proposition 1 already implies that there
should be other candidates for optimality as there is a parameter region for which there is no
saddle point, and hence no stable manifold to it. The following result clarifies (Appendix A.2
contains the proof).
Proposition 2. The set of candidates for an optimal solution consists of the stable paths W s− of
the saddle-point steady state and the trajectory E through the point (c, k) = (1, 0).
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Figure 1: Candidate maximizing trajectories W s− and E in the state-control space.
Proposition 2 is illustrated in Figure 1. The thick black lines W s− and E indicate optimal
solutions. The dotted vertical line c = 1 separates the region with zero production from the
region of positive production. We label the trajectory E the “exit trajectory”, as following this
trajectory implies that firms eventually leave the region with positive production.
Proposition 2 only reduces the set of trajectories by applying necessary conditions for
optimality, but there is no guarantee that an optimal solution exists. The next proposition
summarizes when an optimal solution exists (the proof is in Appendix A.3).
Proposition 3. For all admissible values of the parameters, the following is true. At all initial
points, the optimal control problem has at least one solution, which is among the candidates
specified in Proposition 2. Moreover, there is at most one initial state cˆ such that there are two
optimizing trajectories starting at cˆ.
To assess the dependence of the solution structure on the model parameters, we carry out a
bifurcation analysis. This consists of identifying those parameter values for which the qualitative
structure of the optimal dynamics changes. These ‘bifurcating’ values bound open parameter
regions such that the optimal dynamics are qualitatively identical for all parameter values in
a region (see Wagener, 2003, Kiseleva and Wagener, 2015). Put differently, for all points in a
region, a sufficiently small change in parameter values will not lead to a qualitative change of the
optimal dynamics; regions characterize stable types of dynamics.
System (27) has four distinct stable dynamics types (cf. Hinloopen et al., 2013). These are
illustrated in Figure 2 in case of partial collusion.19 The first type is a “Promising Technology”.
In this case there exists an initial technology cˆ > 1 that is an indifference threshold:20 a point in
state space where the decision maker is indifferent between two optimal trajectories that have
18The monopoly system in Hinloopen et al. (2013) is also a special case of system (27), with α = 1/4.
19The same types emerge under full collusion. The stable dynamics types are compared across scenarios in
Section 5.
20Also known as Skiba, Dechert-Nishimura-Skiba or DNSS point; see Grass et al. (2008).
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Figure 2: R&D investment trajectories for the four stable dynamics types of system (27).
distinct long-term limit behavior. In particular, for 0 < c0 ≤ cˆ it is optimal to start developing the
initial technology, ending up in the saddle-point steady state in the region of positive production.
If 1 < c0 ≤ cˆ, initially firms invest only in R&D; production begins whenever c(t) < 1. If c0 ≥ cˆ,
it is optimal not to initiate R&D efforts; potential future profits do not suffice to compensate for
losses that would be incurred in the initial periods during which firms would invest in R&D but
would not produce yet.21
The second type corresponds to a “Strained Market”, where there is an indifference threshold
below the choke price (that is, in the region with positive production): 0 < cˆ < 1. In this
case, if 0 < c0 < cˆ, the initial technology will be developed towards the saddle-point steady
state. If cˆ < c0 < 1, the exit-trajectory applies; R&D investments only serve to slow down the
technological decay.
In a small part of the parameter space the third type arises: an “Uncertain Future”. Initial
technologies (states) are now divided by a repelling steady state (rather than an indifference
point). If the system starts exactly at the repelling point, it stays there indefinitely; when it starts
close to it, it stays there for a long period of time, after which it converges to one of the two
attractors: the steady state or the exit trajectory.
The fourth type typifies the dynamics of an “Obsolete Technology”. Whatever the initial
technology, (eventually) the firms leaves the market; R&D investments are only used to slow
down the technical decay.
21Note that for c0 = cˆ, there are two distinct R&D investment trajectories, which are, nevertheless, both optimal;
see also Proposition 3.
13
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5
0
5
10
15
20
25
ρ
IR
SN
SN’
IA
ISN
I Promising technology
II Strained market
IV Obsolete technology
φ(1 + β )
III Uncert. fut.
Figure 3: Bifurcation diagram (partial collusion).
The four different dynamics types are grouped conveniently in a bifurcation diagram (see
Figure 3): the graph that indicates for every possible parameter combination the qualitative
features of any market equilibrium as well as the transient dynamics towards them. In Figure 3,
the uppermost curve represents parameter values for which the indifference point is exactly
at c = 1. At the saddle-node curve (SN), an optimal repeller and an optimal attractor collide
and disappear. The curve SN’ corresponds to saddle-node bifurcations in the state-control
system that do not correspond to optimal dynamics. At the indifference-attractor bifurcations
(IA), an indifference point collides with an optimal attractor and both disappear. Finally, at
an indifference-repeller bifurcation (IR), an indifference point turns into an optimal repeller.
The central indifference-saddle-node (ISN) bifurcation point at (ρ, φ(1 + β)) ≈ (2.14, 8.78)
organizes the bifurcation diagram. The curve representing indifference points at c = 1 obtains a
value of φ(1 + β) ≈ 2.998 for ρ = 1× 10−5.
5 Collusion and the incentives to innovate
In this section we compare the global optimum of the two scenarios. For a welfare comparison,
we introduce total discounted values of profits (Π), consumer surplus (CS), and total surplus (TS)
Π =
∫ ∞
0
pi(t)e−ρtdt, (28)
CS =
∫ ∞
0
1
2
(1− p(t))Q(t)e−ρtdt =
∫ ∞
0
2q(t)2e−ρtdt, (29)
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TS = 2Π + CS, (30)
where at time t = 0 firms start with c0 and then invest along the optimal trajectory γ(t) =
(c(t), k(t)) as t→∞.
We first formally establish that the two scenarios yield different (optimal) trajectories. In
Figure 4 the bifurcation diagrams of both scenarios are superimposed. There are significant
quantitative differences between the two diagrams, as reflected by the different locations of the
curves that divide the parameter space. Let Ii, IIi, . . . , i = 1, 2 denote regions I , II, . . . under
scenario i, with i = 1 (2) corresponding to partial (full) collusion. The following then holds (see
Appendix A.4 for the proof).
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Figure 4: Superimposed bifurcation diagrams. Curves of the partial (full) collusion scenario are
grey (black).
Proposition 4. The following inclusions hold:
I1 ⊂ I2,
I1 ∪ II1 ⊂ I2 ∪ II2,
I1 ∪ II1 ∪ III1 ⊂ I2 ∪ II2 ∪ III2.
The first inclusion of Proposition 4 implies that the “Promising Technology” region is larger
if firms collude in the product market; due to collusion, the situation where firms first invest in
R&D, and only after some initial development period start producing, is more likely to occur.
From the third inclusion follows that the “Obsolete Technology” region is smaller if firms collude;
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firms that collude are less likely either not to develop an initial technology, or to invest in R&D
only to abandon the technology in time.
5.1 R&D investment incentives
In line with much of the related literature (Tirole, 1988), Proposition 4 suggests that colluding
firms have in general a stronger incentive to invest in R&D. This turns out to be the case, as the
next proposition formally shows (see Appendix A.5.1 for the proof).
Proposition 5. Investment in R&D in the full collusion scenario is always at least as high as in
the corresponding partial collusion scenario.
Proposition 5 implies the following. First of all, whenever both scenarios lead to the saddle-
point steady state, marginal costs in the full collusion scenario are lower than in case of partial
collusion, because fully colluding firms have invested more in cost-reducing R&D to arrive at
the long-run equilibrium. Put differently, product market collusion yields a higher production
efficiency.
Second, if the initial technology leads to production after some initial development period
only, colluding firms will enter this production phase more quickly because at every instant of
the pre-production phase they invest more in R&D in order to bring the level of marginal costs
below the choke price.
Third, firms that collude in the product market abandon obsolete technologies at a lower pace.
This implication has a similar vein as the argument of Arrow (1962), that a monopolist has less
incentive to invest in R&D than an otherwise identical but perfectly competitive market, because
by doing so the monopolist replaces current monopoly profits by future (higher) monopoly profits.
Here, the alternative for colluding firms is to exit the market more quickly (rather than staying in
the market as a monopolist, as in Arrow, 1962), an alternative that for them is not optimal (see
Figure 5).
The difference in R&D intensity across the two scenarios is also reflected in the type of
trajectories that firms select. To characterize this difference for all possible situations, it is
convenient to have defined the threshold level of initial marginal cost cˆ between ‘eventual exit’
and ‘eventual positive production’. Formally, set cˆ = 0 in the “Obsolete Technology” region and
let cˆ1 and cˆ2 denote the threshold level for the partial collusion and the full collusion scenarios,
respectively. We can then state the following (see Appendix A.5.2 for the proof).
Proposition 6. For all parameter values, either cˆ1 < cˆ2 or cˆ1 = cˆ2 = 0.
The implications of Proposition 6 are twofold. First, if firms collude in the product market,
the set of initial technologies that are developed towards the saddle-point steady state is larger
(see Figure 6). In particular, if the initial technology c0 falls in the non-empty interval (cˆ1, cˆ2), it
will only be brought to full materialization if firms collude in the product market.
Second, the set of initial technologies that triggers no investment in R&D at all or that
induces firms to select the exit trajectory is smaller if firms collude in the product market.
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Figure 5: State-control space (a), total discounted profit (b), consumer surplus (c), and total
surplus (d), when the exit trajectory is an optimal solution. Parameters: (β, ρ, φ) = (1, 1, 2).
Curves of the partial (full) collusion scenario are grey (black).
Figure 7 illustrates this for a Strained Market. The strained investment circumstances induce
partially colluding firms to exit the market in due time for all c0 > cˆ1. In contrast, fully colluding
firms exit the market only for c0 > cˆ2. Initial technologies c0 in the interval (cˆ1, cˆ2) are therefore
only brought to full maturation by firms that collude in the product market.
We can conclude that due to collusion in the product market (i) it is more likely that an initial
technology qualifies as a Promising Technology, and if so, that it is more likely to be developed
further, (ii) it is less likely that an initial technology qualifies as an Obsolete Technology, and if
so, it is more likely that firms invest in R&D, albeit temporarily, and (iii) if an initial technology
causes a Strained Market or if it induces an Uncertain Future, it is less likely that it will be taken
off the market in due time. Put differently, due to product market collusion it is more likely that
firms invest in R&D, and that these investments eventually lead to a steady state with positive
production.
5.2 Total surplus
We next consider the effect of product market collusion on total surplus. Obviously, collusion in
the product market yields higher total surplus if colluding firms develop an initial technology and
arrive at the saddle-point steady state while firms that compete in the product market would not
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Figure 6: State-control space (a), total discounted profit (b), consumer surplus (c), and total
surplus (d), when the indifference point is in the region with zero production. Parameters:
(β, ρ, φ) = (1, 0.1, 2.25). Curves of the partial (full) collusion scenario are grey (black).
develop the technology at all. Formally,22
Proposition 7. Whenever both scenarios have an indifference point above the choke price, the
full collusion scenario yields higher consumer surplus and total surplus than the partial collusion
scenario for all initial technologies in between the two indifference points.
Figure 6 illustrates Proposition 7: for all c0 ∈ (cˆ1, cˆ2), collusion in the product market yields
a higher total surplus. Figure 8 illustrates some comparative statics of the indifference points in
this case. Indeed, these points are positively related to market size and R&D efficiency. Note,
however, that also ∆cˆ = cˆ2 − cˆ1 increases if the R&D process becomes more efficient and/or if
the market size becomes larger, the more so the lower is the discount rate (in Figure 8, a lower
discount rate corresponds to a larger slope of the convex curves). Because future mark-ups are
positively related to both market size and R&D efficiency, an increase in either of these two
has a larger (positive) effect on future profits if firms collude in the product market. And these
future benefits feature more prominently in total discounted profits if the discount rate is lower.
Therefore, indifference points correspond to lower marginal costs values if the discount rate goes
up, all else equal (cf. the relative location of C1 and C2 in Figure 8).
Product market collusion can also yield higher total surplus if colluding firms arrive at the
22The proof of Proposition 7 follows trivially from the fact that i) for all values of c above the indifference point
in the region where c ≥ 1, both q = 0 and k = 0 for all t ∈ [0,∞), and ii) for all values of c below the indifference
point, Π > 0 and, sooner or later, also q > 0 as t→∞.
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Figure 7: State-control space (a), total discounted profit (b), consumer surplus (c), and total
surplus (d), when the indifference point is within the region with positive production. Parameters:
(β, ρ, φ) = (1, 0.1, 2). Curves of the partial (full) collusion scenario are grey (black); curves of
the stable path (exit trajectory) are solid (dotted). Dots indicate the saddle-point steady state.
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Figure 8: Dependence of the indifference point cˆ on model parameters. Curves of the partial
(full) collusion scenario are dotted (solid).
saddle-point steady state while firms that compete in the product market would select the exit
trajectory. In these cases, firms that compete in the product market temporarily produce more.
This is off-set by the added benefits of sustained R&D investments under full collusion if the
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Figure 9: Total surplus when the indifference point is in the region with zero production. Parame-
ters: (β, ρ, φ) = (1, 10, 50). Grey curves correspond to partial collusion, whereas the black ones
correspond to full collusion. c? ≈ 3.6, cˆ1 ≈ 4.01, cˆ2 ≈ 4.74. For all c0 ∈ (c?, cˆ2), total surplus
is higher if firms collude in the product market.
discount rate is sufficiently small (see Figure 7).
Finally, collusion in the product market can also yield a higher total surplus if under both
scenarios firms would select the trajectory towards the saddle-point steady state: in Figure 9,
for all c0 ∈ (c?, cˆ2), total surplus is higher if firms collude in the product market. In this
example, the discount rate is high: ρ = 10, which corresponds, for instance, to the non-rescaled
variables δ = 0.01 and ρ = 0.1. Also, the initial marginal costs are sufficiently high. In such
an environment, the higher R&D investments and the reduced importance that is attached to
future surplus work in favor of product market collusion as under this scenario firms will reach
the production stage more quickly, a benefit that more than off-sets the welfare loss of future
increased mark-ups.23
6 Conclusion
Schumpeter’s famous observation continues to challenge the design of optimal competition
policies for high tech sectors. The classic rationale for competition policies is rooted in their
effect on total surplus. Typically, product market collusion transfers consumer surplus to firm
profits, resulting in a net loss of total surplus. To date, the literature considers this result to
be robust to the increased incentive to invest in R&D that comes with collusion in the product
market. Our analysis shows that it actually fails this robustness check if the phase of development
prior to production is taken into account and/or if all possible R&D investment trajectories are
considered.
According to our analysis, extending an R&D cooperative agreement to collusion in the
product market is welfare enhancing if the market size is large and/or the R&D process is efficient,
given a relatively modest discount rate. The profit potential of a new technology is then relatively
23More precisely, a higher (rescaled) discount rate ρ˜ = ρ/δ implies either a higher discount rate ρ or a lower δ.
With a lower δ, cost reductions take longer, such that the time difference in reaching the production stage between the
two scenarios becomes more pronounced.
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large. As a result, firms that collude in the product market bring more initial technologies to full
materialization.
A particularly disturbing situation arises when the initial draw c0 out of (cˆ1, cˆ2) is above the
choke price (c0 > 1). The welfare cost of prohibiting firms to collude in the product market then
remains hidden because no production is affected by this prohibition. There is no production yet,
and because collusion is prohibited, there will be no production in the future. Put differently, no
production will be taken off the market if firms are prohibited to collude in the product market.
Our analysis thus signals a potential problem for antitrust policy as it shows that prohibiting
collusion in the product market per se is not univocally welfare enhancing. It also shows that
the associated welfare costs might not surface. Further research is needed to substantiate our
qualification of prohibiting collusion per se, including the development of richer models that
allow for learning by doing, stochastic R&D, and asymmetries between firms.
A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Second rescaling of the problem. Recall the dynamic optimization problem: to maximize
Π =
∫ ∞
0
(
α(1− c)2χ(c)− k2) e−ρtdt,
subject to the dynamic restriction
c˙ = (1− φ(1 + β)k)c.
This problem is rewritten by introducing constants
K =
1
φ(1 + β)
and µ =
αφ2(1 + β)2
4ρ
, (31)
and the variable u through
k = Ku.
It is then seen to be equivalent to the problem to maximize
V =
Π
K2
=
∫ ∞
0
(
4ρµ(1− c)2χ(c)− u2) e−ρtdt, (32)
subject to the dynamic restriction
c˙ = (1− u) c
and the control restriction
u ≥ 0.
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The Pontryagin function of this problem is
P = 4ρµ(1− c)2χ(c)− u2 + λc(1− u),
which is maximized at
u = max
{
0,− c
2
λ
}
. (33)
This yields the Hamilton function
H = 4ρµ(1− c)2χ(c) + λc+

(λc)2
4 if λ ≤ 0;
0 if λ > 0.
If λ ≤ 0, the associated state-costate equations read as
c˙ = Hλ =
λc2
2
+ c, (34)
λ˙ = ρλ−Hc = ρλ+ 8ρµ(1− c)χ(c)− λ
2
2
c− λ, (35)
whereas if λ > 0, they simplify to
c˙ = c, λ˙ = (ρ− 1)λ+ 8ρµ(1− c)χ(c). (36)
Using the relation (33) as a variable transformation whenever λ ≤ 0, we can put the system into
state-control form
c˙ = F1(c, u) = c (1− u) , (37)
u˙ = F2(c, u) = ρ (u− 4µc(1− c)χ(c)) . (38)
For later use, we note that in (c, u) variables, the Hamilton function takes the form
Hcontrol(c, u) = 4ρµ(1− c)2χ(c) + u2 − 2u. (39)
A.1.1 Steady states
To determine the steady states of the state-control system (37)–(38), we solve the equations c˙ = 0,
u˙ = 0. It is immediate that this system has no solutions in c > 1.
If 0 ≤ c ≤ 1, the equation c˙ = 0 is satisfied if c = 0 or u = 1. Substitution into u˙ = 0 of
the former yields the steady state (c, u) = (0, 0). Substitution of the latter leads to the quadratic
equation
c2 − c+ 1
4µ
= 0,
which can be written as (
c− 1
2
)2
−D = 0,
22
with
D =
1
4
(
1− 1
µ
)
. (40)
Note that D < 14 , as all parameters are assumed to have positive values. For D > 0, the quadratic
equation has two real solutions
c± =
1
2
±
√
D =
1±√1− 1/µ
2
,
both satisfying 0 < c± < 1; for D = 0, there is a single real solution c = 1/2, while for D < 0,
there is no real solution.
Summarizing, if 0 ≤ c ≤ 1, we have the steady states
(c, u) = e0 = (0, 0)
and, for D ≥ 0,
(c, u) = e± = (c±, u±) =
(
1
2
±
√
D, 1
)
. (41)
A.1.2 Stability
To analyze stability, we have to determine the eigenvalues of
DF =
(
1− u −c
4ρµ(2c− 1) ρ
)
at the steady states e0, e+ and e−. As
DF (e0) =
(
1 0
−4ρµ ρ
)
,
which has eigenvalues ρ and 1, the point e0 is always an unstable node.
Denote the eigenvalues of the matrix
DF (e±) =
(
0 −c±
±8ρµ√D ρ
)
(42)
by λi±, i = 1, 2. They satisfy
λ1± + λ
2
± = traceDF (e±) = ρ
and
λ1±λ
2
± = detDF (e±) = ±8ρµc±
√
D.
We have seen before that c± > 0 whenever it is real. If D > 0, it follows that the eigenval-
ues λ1−, λ2− have opposite sign, and e− is a saddle, whereas λ1+ and λ2+ have the same sign and
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positive sum, implying that e+ is an unstable node.
Expressing these results in the original variables, we obtain the results announced in the
proposition.
A.1.3 Bifurcation analysis
It remains to prove the occurrence of a saddle-node bifurcation. If µ = µb = 1, then D = 0 and
the point eb = (cb, ub) = (1/2, 1) is a steady state with eigenvalues 0 and ρ respectively.
We use a result from Sotomayor (1973) (quoted as Theorem 3.4.1 in Guckenheimer and
Holmes, 1986), which for planar dynamical systems states that if the family
x˙ = F (x;µ)
parametrised by µ satisfies the following three conditions
1. DxF (x0;µ0) has a simple eigenvalue 0 with right eigenvector v and left eigenvector w;
2. wDµF (x0;µ0) 6= 0;
3. w
[
D2xF (x0;µ0)(v, v)
] 6= 0;
then it features a non-degenerate saddle-node bifurcation at x = x0 for µ = µ0.
As DF (eb;µb) =
(
0 −1/2
0 ρ
)
, it follows that v =
(
1
0
)
and w =
(
2ρ 1
)
are respectively
left and right eigenvectors associated to the eigenvalue 0. Furthermore
wDµF (eb;µb) = w
(
0
−ρ
)
= −ρ 6= 0
and, as v =
(
1
0
)
,
w
[
D2xF (eb;µb)(v, v)
]
= w
∂2
∂c2
F = w
(
0
8ρ
)
= 8ρ 6= 0.
We conclude that a nondegenerate saddle-node bifurcation occurs in the system at µ = 1. This
completes the proof of Proposition 1.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 2
As in the proof of Proposition 1, introduce the constants
K =
1
φ(1 + β)
and µ =
αφ(1 + β)
4ρK
=
αφ2(1 + β)2
4ρ
,
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as well as the rescaled control variable u = k/K. The state-control system then takes the form
c˙ = c (1− u) , u˙ = ρ
(
u− 4µc(1− c)χ(c)
)
. (43)
Recall also the notations
e0 = (0, 0), e− =
(
1−√1− 1/µ
2
, 1
)
, e+ =
(
1 +
√
1− 1/µ
2
, 1
)
for the three steady states of the system, and introduce
e1 = (1, 0).
To prove the proposition, the state-control space is partitioned into four subsets, R1, R2, R3
and E. Of these, the sets R3 and E are independent of the values of the system parameters. They
are given as
R3 = {(c, u) : 0 < c < 1, u = 0}, E = {(c, u) : c ≥ 1, u = 0}.
Let U = {(c, u) : u > 0} be the upper half plane. Given the set R1, the set R2 is equal to
R2 = U\R1.
It remains to specify R1, which is the first step in the proof. Then it is shown that no trajectory in
either R2 or R3 can be optimal. The next step is to demonstrate that of the trajectories in R1,
only those can be optimal which converge either to a steady state in R1, necessarily a saddle, or
which end up in the “exit trajectory” E. Then it has to be shown that the trajectories that are not
excluded up to this point, the candidate trajectories, “cover” the state space; that is, for every
initial state c0, there is at least one candidate trajectory passing through the line c = c0. Using
parts of the remaining candidate trajectories, we construct a viscosity solution of the Hamilton-
Jacobi equation, which is then necessarily the value function. This shows the optimality of the
remaining trajectories.
A.2.1 Definition of R1
Set
u0 = max{1, µ},
and consider the trajectory γ(t) = (c(t), u(t)) of the system (43) that passes at t = 0 through
the point (1, u0).
If µ ≤ 1, then u0 = 1 and R1 is specified as
R1 = {(c, u) : 0 ≤ c ≤ 1, 0 < u ≤ 1} .
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If the other possibility µ > 1 obtains, then u0 = µ > 1 and c˙(0) < 0. In this situation, let τ
be the least upper bound of those negative values of t that satisfy c(t) ≤ 1; that is, let
τ = sup{t < 0 : c(t) ≤ 1}.
We claim that τ is finite. Arguing by contradiction, assume that τ = −∞. Then for all t < 0 we
have c(t) > 1, and equation (43) implies that for all t < 0
u(t) = u0eρt.
In particular, there is a t1 < 0 such that
u(t) < u0eρt1 =: K1 < 1
for all t < t1. But for those values of t, it follows that
c˙ = (1− u) c > (1−K1) c =: K2c,
where K2 > 0. Gronwall’s lemma implies then that
c(t) < eK2(t−t1)c(t1)
if t < t1. But for t sufficiently small, this is smaller than 1, contradicting the hypothesis
that τ = −∞. Hence τ is finite.
Introduce uτ by the equation γ(τ) = (1, uτ ). The set R1 is defined as follows: it is the
open region bounded by the concatenation of the curve γ taken between t = 0 and t = τ ,
connecting (1, u0) and (1, uτ ), the vertical line segment connecting (1, uτ ) to e1, the horizontal
segment connecting e1 to e0, the vertical segment connecting e0 to (0, u0), and the horizontal
segment connecting (0, u0) to (1, u0). See Figure 10 for the possible shapes of R1.
R1
R2
R3
E
1 c
Μ
1
u
(a) µ ≤ 1
R1
R2
R3
E
1 c
Μ
1
u
(b) µ > 1
Figure 10: Definition of the set R1. Solid curves denote the boundary of the set, dashed curves
the isoclines of the system (37)–(38).
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A.2.2 Trajectories in R2 cannot be optimal
In the second step of the proof, the transversality condition is used to show that any trajectory
that passes through points in R2 cannot be optimal.
Beginning with R2, we note that the subset
R
(1)
2 = {(c, u) : 0 ≤ c ≤ 1} ∩R2
of R2 is a forward trapping region: once a trajectory of (43) is inside R
(1)
2 , it remains inside
for all subsequent times. This fact is established by demonstrating that the vector field defined
by (43) is inward pointing on the boundary of R(1)2 . For, if u = u0 = max{1, µ} and 0 ≤ c ≤ 1,
then
u˙ ≥ ρ(µ− 4µc(1− c)) = 0.
If c = 0, then c˙ = 0, and if finally c = 1 and u ≥ u0 ≥ 1, then
c˙ ≤ c (1− 1) = 0.
Actually, we can make the sharper statement that if u > u0, then
u˙ > 0. (44)
To show that no trajectory that enters R(1)2 can be maximizing, pick an arbitrary trajectory γ
such that γ(t0) ∈ R(1)2 at a given time t0. By the Poincare´-Bendixon theorem, γ(t) is either
unbounded, or its ω-limit set is a steady state, or a limit cycle. The latter possibility is excluded,
as the state-costate system, which is in one-to-one relation with the state-control system, has
constant positive divergence everywhere (see Wagener, 2003). There are no steady states in R(1)2 .
Hence there is a sequence t0, t1, . . . such that ‖γ(ti)‖ → ∞. In particular, there is t¯ > t0
such that u(t¯) > 2u0. But then u(t) is monotonely increasing towards infinity as t > t¯, as a
consequence of (44).
Consequently, if t ≥ t¯, then
c˙ ≤ (1− 2u0) c ≤ −c.
By Gronwall’s lemma it follows that
c(t) ≤ c(t¯)e−(t−t¯). (45)
Likewise, if t ≥ t¯, then u(t) > 2u0 and
u˙ ≥ ρ(u− µ).
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Gronwall’s lemma implies then that
u(t) ≥ µ+ (2u0 − µ)eρ(t−t¯). (46)
If the trajectory γ(t) = (c(t), u(t)) is optimal, then by the Hamilton-Jacobi equation (see
e.g. Wagener, 2003), the total profit Π takes the value
Π(c(0)) =
1
ρ
H(c(0), λ(0)) =
1
ρ
Hcontrol(c(0), u(0)). (47)
Michel’s transversality condition (Michel, 1982) states that along a maximizing trajectory the
relation
lim
t→∞Π(c(t))e
−ρt = 0
holds. Combining (47) and (39) yields
Π(c(t))e−ρt ≥ (4ρµ(1− c(t))2χ(c(t)) + u(t)(u(t)− 2)) e−ρt
Using that the first term between brackets is always nonnegative, and taking into account (46)
yields that
Πe−ρt ≥ (2u0 − µ)eρ(t−t¯)
(
µ− 2 + (2u0 − µ)eρ(t−t¯)
)
e−ρt.
As 2u0 − µ ≥ µ > 0, it follows that the right hand side of this inequality tends to infinity
as t→∞. But then
lim
t→∞Π(c(t))e
−ρt =∞,
and γ cannot be a maximizing trajectory.
It remains to show that no trajectory passing through
R
(2)
2 = R2\R(1)2 ,
the complement ofR(1)2 inR2, can be optimal. Consider therefore a trajectory γ such that γ(t0) ∈
R
(2)
2 for some t0. As in the definition of the region R1, using Gronwall’s lemma it can be shown
that there is some t1 > t0 such that u(t1) > 1, and some t2 > t1 such that u(t2) > 1
and c(t2) = 1. But then γ enters the trapping region R
(1)
2 , and we have already seen that such
trajectories cannot be optimal.
A.2.3 Trajectories intersecting R3 cannot be optimal
If a trajectory intersects R3, the state-control representation breaks down, and we have to switch
to the state-costate representation.
Pick an arbitrary state-costate trajectory γ(t) = (c(t), λ(t)), with associated control u(t) =
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max{0,−12c(t)λ(t)} such that
(
c(t0), u(t0)
) ∈ R3 for some t0 ≥ 0 and (c(t), u(t)) ∈ R1 for
all t < t0 that are sufficienty close to t0. The costate λ then satisfies λ(t0) = 0 and λ˙(t0) > 0.
Note that the region
R˜3 = {(c, λ) : λ > 0}
is a trapping region for the state-costate flow, as λ˙ ≥ 0 whenever λ = 0.
Using Gronwall’s lemma, we show first that
c(t) ≥ c(t0)e(t−t0),
for t > t0, since c˙ = c ≥ c in R˜3 (equation (36)). It follows that there is t1 > t0 such
that c(t) > 1 for all t > t1.
Let h(t) = H(c(t), λ(t)). Note that for all t > t1 we have c(t) > 1 and λ(t) > 0, and
consequently h(t) = λ(t)c(t) > 0. The state-costate equations reduce to
c˙ = c, λ˙ = (ρ− 1)λ. (48)
Compute:
h˙ = λ˙c+ λc˙ = ρλc = ρh.
Hence
h(t) = h(t1)eρ(t−t1)
for all t > t1. But then
lim
t→∞h(t)e
−ρt = h(t1)e−ρt1 > 0.
If γ is optimal, Michel’s transversality condition implies that
lim
t→∞Π(c(t))e
−ρt = lim
t→∞
1
ρ
H(c(t), λ(t))e−ρt = lim
t→∞
h(t)
ρ
e−ρt = 0.
As this is a contradiction, the trajectory γ cannot be optimal.
A.2.4 Trajectories in R1 with wrong limit behavior cannot be optimal
As the set R1 is bounded, by the Poincare´-Bendixon theorem trajectories in R1 can either
converge to a steady state, or leave R1 (cf. the argument in Section A.2.2). Those entering
either R2 or R3 have already been shown to be suboptimal. The remaining possibility is to
leave R1 through the point e1 and enter the line segment E; these trajectories remain candidates
for optimality.
Trajectories remaining in R1 have to converge to a steady state. From proposition 1 we learn
that e0 and e+ are unstable nodes, to which no trajectory can converge as t → ∞. The only
remaining candidate is then the saddle e−, if µ < 1, or the bifurcating point eb if µ = 1.
This completes the proof of Proposition 2.
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A.3 Proof of proposition 3
A.3.1 Construction of policy functions
The first step in the proof is to construct those (parts of) trajectories of the system (43) that will
turn out to optimize the profit functional. In particular, we shall construct a, possibly multivalued,
policy function uf such that the following holds. If (c0, u0) is such that u0 = uf (c0), then
the trajectory (c(t), u(t)) of (43) starting at this point satisfies, for all t ≥ 0, that c˙(t) 6= 0
and u(t) = uf (c(t)).
Again we have to distinguish between the situations µ < 1 and µ ≥ 1.
First situation: µ < 1. Here the only steady state of (43) is the origin e0, which is an unstable
node. Therefore, the only candidate optimizer is the trajectory passing through the point e1. Note
that a corollary of the analysis performed above is that the set R1 is a backward trapping region:
if a trajectory is in R1 for some time, it is in R1 for all previous times. Necessarily it converges
to the origin as t→ −∞.
Let γ(t) = (cγ(t), uγ(t)) be the trajectory such that γ(0) = e1. As γ(t) ∈ R1 for all t < 0,
it follows that c˙γ > 0 for all t < 0 (recall that R1 is open). As u(t) = 0 for all t ≥ 0, it follows
that c˙γ > 0 for all t, and that the map cγ : R → (0,∞) is invertible, with inverse t = tγ(c).
Define uf : (0,∞)→ R by
uf (c) = uγ (tγ(c))
Then the image of the curve γ : R→ R2 is equal to the graph of the function uf : (0,∞)→ R,
as
uγ(t) = uf (cγ(t))
for all t.
Second situation: µ ≥ 1. In this case, though R1 is still a backward trapping region, there are
at least two steady states in R1: apart from the origin e0, we also have e− and e+. As seen before,
if D > 0, the first is a saddle and the second a repeller; if D = 0, these two points coincide in eb.
Denote by δ1 the part of the parabola u = 4µc(1− c) connecting e0 to e−, by δ2 the segment
of the line u = 1 connecting e− to e+, by δ3 that part of the same parabola which connects e+
to e1, and by δ4 the segment of the line u = 0 connecting e1 to e0. All curves δi are taken without
their endpoint. Let finally S1 ⊂ R1 be the open subregion of R1 that is bounded by the curves δi,
i = 1, . . . , 4. See Figure 11.
Let γ(t) = (c(t), u(t)) be the trajectory of (43) satisfying γ(0) = e1. As the open set S1 is
bounded, the trajectory γ either converges to a steady state on the boundary of S1, or it enters S1
for the last time by crossing one of the curves δi. We analyze the possibilities one by one.
The trajectory remains in S1 for all t < 0 and tends to e0. If γ(t) ∈ S1 for all t < 0
and γ(t)→ e0 as t→ −∞, then the results of the situation D < 0 carry over unmodified, and
we obtain a policy function uf : (0,∞)→ R.
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S1
S2
S3 S4
∆1
∆2
∆3
∆4e0 e1
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u
Figure 11: Subdivision of region R1. The vertices e0, e1, e− and e+, the edges δi, i = 1, . . . , 4,
and the faces Si, i = 1, . . . , 4 are defined in the text.
The trajectory remains in S1 for all t < 0 and tends to e−. If γ(t) ∈ S1 for all t < 0
and γ(t)→ e− as t→ −∞, then γ is part of the unstable manifold of e−. Reasoning as in the
situation D < 0, we obtain a policy function
u
(1)
f : (c−,∞)→ R
with
lim
c↓c−
u
(1)
f (c) = u− = 1.
However, this function is not defined for all c > 0. To construct a policy function for 0 < c < c−,
we take a trajectory γs on the left half of the stable manifold of the saddle e−.
We claim that this part of the stable manifold is contained in its entirety in the region S2
that is bounded by δ1, the segment of u = 1 connecting e− to (0, 1), and the segment of the
line c = 0 connecting (0, 1) to e0. It is straightforward to show that S2 is a backward trapping
region; consequently, every trajectory in S2 converges to the unstable node e0 as t→ −∞.
The stable manifold of e− is tangent to the stable eigenspace of
DF (e−) =
(
0 −c−
8ρµ
√
D ρ
)
,
cf. equation (42), at e−. Note that the vector v = (0, 1) cannot be an eigenvector of this matrix,
as c− 6= 0. Therefore any eigenvector v = (v1, v2) satisfies v1 6= 0; it may therefore be assumed
that v1 = 1.
Let vs = (1, vs2) be the stable eigenvector, with eigenvalue λ
s < 0. The eigenvalue equation
DF (e−)vs = λsvs
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then yields
vs2 = −
λs
c−
> 0.
Locally around the saddle, the stable manifold coincides with the graph of a function ws, defined
on a neighborhood of c−, which is of the form
ws(c) = c− + vs2(c− c−) +O((c− c−)2).
In particular, if c0 < c− is sufficiently close to c−, then
dws
dc
(c) > 0
for all c ∈ [c0, c−]. The trajectory γ(t) of (43) such that γ(0) = (c0, ws(c0)) consequently
satisfies c0 ≤ c(t) < c−, as well as c˙(t) > 0 and u˙(t) > 0 for all t ≥ 0. We infer that necessarily
4µc(t)(1− c(t)) < u(t) < 1
for all t ≥ 0, and hence (c(t), u(t)) ∈ S2 for all t ≥ 0. But as S2 is a backward trapping region,
the trajectory γ is contained in S2 for all t, hence satisfying
γ(t)→ e0 as t→ −∞, and γ(t)→ e− as t→∞.
As in S2, we have c˙ > 0 everywhere, and we construct as above a policy function
u
(2)
f : (0, c−)→ R, with limc↑c− u
(2)
f (c) = u− = 1.
It follows that the function
uf (c) =

u
(1)
f (c) if c > c−,
u− if c = c−,
u
(2)
f (c) if 0 < c < c−,
is a continuous policy function that is defined for all c > 0.
The trajectory remains in S1 for all t < 0 and tends to e+. As before, we can construct a
policy function
u
(1)
f : (c+,∞)→ R, with limc↓c+ u
(1)
f (c) = u+ = 1.
The remaining part of the policy function has to be furnished by the stable manifold of e−. As
above, the left half of this stable manifold furnishes a policy function
u
(2)
f : (0, c−)→ R, with limc↑c− u
(2)
f (c) = u− = 1.
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We turn to the right half of the stable manifold. For values of c0 larger than but close to c−, the
point (c0, u0) = (c0, ws(c0)) on the stable manifold is contained in the bounded open region S3
that is bounded by the line u = 1 and the parabola u = 4µc(1 − c). In this region c˙ < 0
and k˙ < 0. Fix (c0, u0) and consider the trajectory γ of (43) such that γ(0) = (c0, u0). This
trajectory enters S3 through the part of the parabola connecting its vertex (1/2, µ) with the
point e+. It enters from the region S4 that is bounded by that same part of the parabola, the
line u = u+ and the boundary of R1. In that region, c˙ < 0, but k˙ > 0. It follows that the
trajectory has to enter S4 through the line segment of c = c+ connecting e+ and (c+, µ), or
through one of the endpoints.
If γ(t)→ e+ as t→ −∞, then its graph defines a policy function
u
(3)
f : (c−, c+)→ R with limc↓c− u
(3)
f (c) = u− = 1, limc↑c+
u
(3)
f (c) = u+ = 1.
A continuous policy function is then given by
uf (c) =

u
(1)
f (c) if c > c+,
u+ if c = c+,
u
(2)
f (c) if 0 < c < c−,
u− if c = c−,
u
(3)
f (c) if c− < c < c+.
Otherwise, there is a time t1 < 0, such that c(t1) = c+ and u(t1) > u+. As in this case γ(t)
does not tend to a steady state in the boundary of S4, it has to enter S4 for some t2 < t1; the only
possibility for this is through the line u = 1. We therefore have
γ(t2) = (cM , 1).
In this situation, the graph γ([t2,∞)) defines a policy function
u
(3)
f : (c−, cM )→ R with limc↓c− u
(3)
f (c) = u− = 1, limc↑cM
u
(3)
f (c) = 1.
On the interval (c+, cM ), there are now two policy functions defined. Recall that the total profit
at an initial state c of an R&D policy for which u = uf (c) is given by
Π(c) =
1
ρ
Hcontrol(c, u) =
1
ρ
(
4ρµ(1− c)2χ(c) + u2 − 2u) .
For fixed values of c, the function Hcontrol(c, u) is minimal at u = 1. Hence the policy u
(3)
f is
superior to u(1)f at c = c+, but it is inferior to it at c = cM . As both functions are continuous,
there is a value c = cˆ such that both policies generate the same total profit. This is an indifference
point, as the manager is indifferent between two policies at this state. A policy function, which is
33
at one point two-valued, is then given by
uf (c) =

u
(1)
f (c) if c > cˆ,
u
(1)
f (cˆ) or u
(3)
f (cˆ) if c = cˆ,
u
(2)
f (c) if 0 < c < c−,
u− if c = c−,
u
(3)
f (c) if c− < c < cˆ.
Note that the induced total profit Π(c) = Hcontrol(c, uf (c))/ρ is Lipschitz continuous.
The trajectory enters S1 for the last time through δ1. The next situation to be investigated
is that the trajectory γ satisfying γ(0) = e1 enters S1 through δ1 at some time t1 < 0, and
remains in S1 for all t1 < t < 0. But then it has to be in the backward trapping region S2 for
all t < t1, and it converges to e0 as t→ −∞. As c˙ > 0 in both S1 and S2, we can construct a
differentiable policy function exactly as in the situation that the trajectory remains in S1 for t < 0
and converges to e0.
The trajectory enters S1 for the last time through δ2. Finally consider the situation that the
trajectory γ that passes through e1 at t = 0 enters S1 through δ2 for some t1 < 0, and remains
in S1 for all t1 < t < 0. Introduce cm by setting γ(t1) = (cm, 1). As c˙(t) > 0 for t1 < t < 0 as
well as for t ≥ 0, we can construct a continuous policy function
u
(1)
f : [cm,∞)→ R, u(1)f (cm) = 1.
in the usual manner. The left branch of the stable manifold of the saddle e− furnishes a continuous
policy function
u
(2)
f : (0, c−)→ R, with limc↑c− u
(2)
f (c) = u− = 1,
and the right branch of that manifold furnishes a continuous policy function
u
(3)
f : (c−, cM )→ R, with limc↓c− u
(3)
f (c) = u− = 1, u
(3)
f (cM ) = 1,
where c+ ≤ cM . Invoking the same arguments as above, we show that u(3)f is superior to u(1)f
at c = cm and inferior to it at c = cM . By the intermediate value theorem, there is an indifference
point cˆ such that cm < cˆ < cM , and such that the manager is indifferent between the two policies
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at c = cˆ. A policy function defined on all points of state space is then
uf (c) =

u
(1)
f (c) if c > cˆ,
u
(1)
f (cˆ) or u
(3)
f (cˆ) if c = cˆ,
u
(2)
f (c) if 0 < c < c−,
u− if c = c−,
u
(3)
f (c) if c− < c < cˆ.
Summary. For all parameters, we have constructed a policy function
uf : (0,∞)→ R,
which is single-valued, except at most at one point cˆ, the indifference point. Moreover, the values
of the two trajectories originating at an indifference point are the same.
A.3.2 Policy functions generate viscosity solutions of the Hamilton-Jacobi equation
Using relation (47), we have that
V (c) =
1
ρ
Hcontrol(c, uf (c))
is well-defined at c = cˆ, continuous and continuously differentiable at all points c > 0 except cˆ.
Moreover, the value of the total profit (32) along a trajectory γ of the state-control system (37)
such that γ(0) = (c, uf (c)) is equal to V (c).
We now go back to the state-costate representation (34)–(35), and introduce the feedback
costate function
λf (c) = −2
c
uf (c).
Note that then
V (c) =
1
ρ
H(c, λf (c)). (49)
By construction, if γ(t) = (c(t), λ(t)) is a solution of the state-costate system such that λ(0) =
λf (c(0)), then
λ(t) = λf (c(t)) for all t.
If t > 0, then c(t) 6= cˆ and λf is differentiable at c(t); by the chain rule
λ˙ = λ′f (c)c˙. (50)
We claim that λf (c) = V ′(c) for all c 6= cˆ. For, differentiating (49) with respect to c yields
V ′(c) =
1
ρ
(
Hc +Hλλ
′
f (c)
)
.
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Evaluating this equation at c = c(t), using first (50) and then (34) and (35) gives
V ′
(
c(t)
)
=
1
ρ
(
Hc +Hλ
λ˙
c˙
)
=
1
ρ
(
Hc +Hλ
ρλ−Hc
Hλ
)
= λ(t) = λf
(
c(t)
)
;
this proves the claim.
It follows that the function V defined by (49) is a regular solution of the Hamilton-Jacobi
equation
ρV (c) = H(c, V ′(c)) (51)
for all c 6= cˆ.
Viscosity solutions. We quote the definition of viscosity sub- and supersolutions from Fleming
and Soner (2006, section II.11, p. 106).
Definition
1◦ A function W is a viscosity subsolution of (51) at c¯, if for every continuously differentiable
function w such that the difference W − w takes a local maximum at c¯, we have
ρV (c¯)−H(c¯, w′(c¯)) ≤ 0. (52)
2◦ A function W is a viscosity supersolution of (51) at c¯, if for every continuously differentiable
function w such that the difference W − w takes a local minimum at c¯, we have
ρV (c¯)−H(c¯, w′(c¯)) ≥ 0. (53)
3◦ A functionW is a viscosity solution of (51), if it is both a viscosity subsolution and a viscosity
supersolution.
As V is continuously differentiable in the neighborhood of every point c¯ 6= cˆ, taking w = V
in these definitions shows that V is a viscosity solution of the Hamilton-Jacobi equation (51) at c¯
if and only if it is a regular solution at c¯.
It remains to show that V is a viscosity solution at an indifference point cˆ. Note that the left
and right limits of V ′(c) exist at cˆ; we write
λˆ− = lim
c↑cˆ
V ′(c), λˆ+ = lim
c↓cˆ
V ′(c).
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From the analysis done above, we infer that
λˆ− < λˆ+
Let v be a continuously differentiable function such that V − v takes a local minimum at c = cˆ.
Then necessarily
lim
c↑cˆ
V ′(c)− v′(c) ≤ 0, lim
c↓cˆ
V ′(c)− v′(c) ≥ 0,
implying that
λˆ− ≤ v′(c) ≤ λˆ+. (54)
As cˆ is an indifference point, we have that
H(cˆ, λˆ−) = H(cˆ, λˆ+) = ρV (cˆ).
Moreover, the Hamilton function H(c, λ) is convex in λ. Together with (54) this implies that
ρV (cˆ)−H(cˆ, v′(cˆ)) ≥ 0.
Hence V is a viscosity supersolution.
Consider now the situation that v is a continuously differentiable function such that V − v
takes a local maximum at cˆ. Then
lim
c↑cˆ
V ′(c)− v′(c) ≥ 0, lim
c↓cˆ
V ′(c)− v′(c) ≤ 0,
which implies that
v′(cˆ) ≤ λˆ− < λˆ+ ≤ v′(cˆ),
which is a contradiction. There is no differentiable function such that V − v takes a local
minimum; but then for all such functions, the inequality (52) holds at cˆ, and V is a viscosity
subsolution.
As we know (cf. Fleming and Soner, 2006) that the unique viscosity solution of the Hamilton-
Jacobi equation is the value function of the problem, it follows that the trajectories defined by the
policy function are optimal. This concludes the proof.
A.4 Proof of Proposition 4
This is an immediate consequence of the scaling (31). For assume that there is a bifurcation
at (µ, ρ) = (µ∗, ρ∗). Then for ρ = ρ∗, the value K−1 = φ(1 + β) is bifurcating if
K−1∗ =
2
√
ρ∗µ∗√
α
.
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As α = 1/9 under partial collusion and α = 1/8 under full collusion, this implies
K−1∗partial = 6
√
ρ∗µ∗ > 4
√
2
√
ρ∗µ∗ = K−1∗full.
This proves the proposition.
A.5 Proof of Propositions 6 and 5
We want to compare, for a given parameter combination, the full collusion situation α = 18 ,
and the partial collusion situation α = 19 . Performing the scaling to (c, u) variables and (µ, ρ)
parameters, this reduces to comparing the partial collusion situation (µ1, ρ) with the full collusion
situation (µ2, ρ), where the µi are related as
µ2 =
9
8
µ1.
Denote by uif , i = 1, 2 the corresponding policy functions, and recall that their graphs are
locally equal to a portion of a trajectory of (37)–(38), with u replaced by u1 or u2, depending
on whether µ = µ1 or µ = µ2. Invoking the chain rule as in (50), we can derive a differential
equation for ui = uif as follows:
dui
dc
=
u˙i
c˙
=
ρ (ui − 4µc(1− c)χ)
c(1− ui) ;
here, we have written χ = χ(c) for brevity. This is a first order non-autonomous differential
equation, with singularities at c = 0 and ui = 1.
Writing ∆µ = µ2 − µ1 and ∆u = u2 − u1, the difference ∆u satisfies the following
differential relation:
d∆u
dc
=
ρ (u2 − 4µ2c(1− c)χ)
c(1− u2) −
ρ (u1 − 4µ1c(1− c)χ)
c(1− u1)
=
ρ(1− u1) (u2 − 4µ2c(1− c)χ)
c(1− u1)(1− u2) −
ρ(1− u2) (u1 − 4µ1c(1− c)χ)
c(1− u1)(1− u2)
=
ρ (u2 − u1u2 − 4c(1− c)χ(µ2 − u1µ2))
c(1− u1)(1− u2)
− ρ (u1 − u1u2 − 4c(1− c)χ(µ1 − u2µ1))
c(1− u1)(1− u2)
=
ρ (∆u− 4c(1− c)χ(∆µ+ u2µ2 − u1µ2 − u2µ2 + u2µ1))
c(1− u1)(1− u2)
=
ρ (∆u− 4c(1− c)χ(∆µ+ µ2∆u− u2∆µ))
c(1− u1)(1− u2)
=
ρ (1− 4µ2c(1− c)χ)
c(1− u1)(1− u2) ∆u−
4ρ(1− c)χ
1− u1 ∆µ
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As u1 and u2 are known, this relation is of the form
d∆u
dc
= a(c)∆u+ b(c),
where a and b are known functions. For
∆u(c0) = ∆0
the variations of constants formula for the solution reads as
∆u(c) = ∆0e
∫ c
c0
a(x)dx
+
∫ c
c0
b(x)e
∫ c
x a(y)dydx.
A.5.1 Proof of Proposition 5
Consider first the situation that there is a value 0 ≤ c¯ ≤ 1 such that for all c ∈ (c¯, 1] the
optimal trajectories for both the partial and the full collusion case leave the production region
through e1. As we know that trajectories through e1 can be optimal only if they have not crossed
the line u = 1 yet, the term b of the variations of constants formula satisfies
b(c) = −4ρ(1− c)χ
1− u1 ∆µ ≤ 0
for c¯ < c ≤ 1. Taking c0 = 1 gives ∆0 = 0, which implies that
∆(c) > 0
for all c¯ < c ≤ 1. Hence, R&D effort under full collusion is always larger than R&D effort under
partial collusion if both lead to eventually leaving the market.
Next, we consider the situation that there is some c¯ > 0, such that for all c ∈ (0, c¯), the
optimal trajectories for both the partial and the full collusion case converge to their respective
steady states e1− = (c1−, 1) and e2− = (c2−, 1). As µ2 < µ1, it follows that 0 < c2− < c1− ≤ 1/2.
The stable manifold tending to e2− can only leave the region bounded by the parabola u = µ2c(1−
c) and the lines u = 1 and c = 1/2 through the line segment connecting the points (1/2, 1)
with (1/2, µ2). It follows that necessarily
u2(c
1
−) > u1(c
1
−), or equivalently, ∆(c
1
−) > 0.
We have already established that trajectories tending to either e1− or e2− can only be optimal if
they do not cross the line u = 1. Therefore
b(c) =
4ρ(1− c)χ
u1 − 1 ∆µ > 0,
39
if 0 < c < c¯, and the variations of constants formula implies
∆(c) > 0 for all c1− ≤ c < c¯.
Moreover u1(c) < 1 if 0 < c < c1−, implying that b(c) < 0 there. Again using the variations of
constants formula, we obtain
∆(c) > 0 for all 0 < c ≤ c1−
as well.
Finally, if the optimal trajectory of the full collusion case converges to e2−, whereas the
optimal trajectory of the partial collusion case exits the production region through e1, we have
that the former satisfies u ≥ 1 and the latter u ≤ 1.
This proves Proposition 5.
A.5.2 Proof of Proposition 6
To prove Proposition 6, we again use the fact that the value of the integral Π over a trajectory
starting at a point (c, u) equals
Π(c, u) =
1
ρ
Hcontrol(c, u) =
1
ρ
(
4ρµ(1− c)2χ− 1 + (u− 1)2)
= h(c) + C(u− 1)2. (55)
If c = cˆ is an indifference point, there are values uˆ(1) > uˆ(2) such that the trajectories starting
at (cˆ, uˆ(i)), for i = 1, 2, are both optimal and have both the same value. Note that the trajectory
through (cˆ, uˆ(1)) goes to the left, and that through (cˆ, uˆ(2)) goes to the right. As
Π
(
cˆ, uˆ(1)
)
= Π
(
cˆ, uˆ(2)
)
,
it follows that
|uˆ(1) − 1| = |uˆ(2) − 1|.
Consider a fixed value of ρ and two values µ1, µ2 of µ such that µ2 = (9/8)µ1; that is, (µ1, ρ)
describes a partial collusion situation, and (µ2, ρ) is the corresponding full collusion situation.
Assume first that there is an indifference point in the partial collusion problem; denote these
points as cˆ1, and the corresponding values of u as
uˆ
(1)
1 < uˆ
(2)
1 .
We have seen in the proof of Proposition 5 that necessarily the full collusion trajectory going
towards e2− is above the partial collusion trajectory going towards e1−. Denote its intersection
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with the line c = cˆ1 by (cˆ1, uˆ
(1)
2 ). We have that
|uˆ(1)2 − 1| > |uˆ(1)1 − 1|.
We argue by contradiction. Assume that the threshold cˆ2 in the full collusion case exists and is
below the threshold in the partial collusion case, then the full collusion trajectory going right,
that is, to e1, has to intersect the line c = cˆ1 in a point (cˆ1, uˆ
(2)
2 ). Moreover, this trajectory has to
be optimal at cˆ1. Using (55), this implies that
|uˆ(1)2 − 1| < |uˆ(2)2 − 1|.
Finally, the full collusion trajectory has to be above the partial collusion trajectory going to e1,
implying
|uˆ(2)2 − 1| < |uˆ(2)1 − 1|.
Combining these inequalities with the fact that cˆ1 is an indifference point in the partial collusion
situation, we arrive at
|uˆ(1)2 − 1| > |uˆ(1)1 − 1| = |uˆ(2)1 − 1| > |uˆ(2)2 − 1| > |uˆ(1)2 − 1|.
But this is a contradiction. The proof in situation that the threshold is a repeller is similar and
will be omitted.
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